Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, there has been a significant increase in the spread of disinformation and hostile propaganda in Slovakia. A polarized society is particularly vulnerable to such phenomena, and Slovakia, given its high degree of polarization, provides a favorable environment for disinformation and propaganda.
The chat platform Telegram is one of the main channels for spreading Russian propaganda in Slovakia and is recognized in many European countries as a key source of misleading and harmful information. It serves as the main gateway for disinformation and propaganda, which are then disseminated throughout the Slovak information space. The main sources of propagandist content are official Russian government channels, military bloggers, and propagandists. They promote anti-Western narratives and glorify Russian military actions. Specific Telegram channels and profiles in Slovakia actively adopt and spread these narratives. Some of these are extremely active and maintain high levels of viewership over time.
Key Findings:
- Russian content is systematically shared in Slovakia through a network of eight channels, which are often linked to pro-Russian groups operating within the country. Among the most active propagators of Russian content on Slovak Telegram are the channels Pravda Víťazí, Casus Belli Live, KSB Správy, and Infokanál Klubu Nekonvenčne Mysliacich.
- Since the beginning of 2022, this network in Slovakia has adopted over 45,000 messages from Russian-language channels. Of this total, more than 80% of the content (over 36,000 messages) comes from just seven channels, with the most prominent being the Russian Embassy in Slovakia, the state news agency RIA Novosti, and the Russian military correspondent Rybar.
- Disinformation is typically spread in a coordinated and rapid manner. Key themes include discrediting Ukraine, criticizing the EU and NATO, and portraying Russia as a victim or defender of traditional values and global stability.
The findings of this analysis highlight the need for systematic and effective monitoring of the spread of disinformation using a whole-of-society approach. This includes not only specialized government departments but also non-profit organizations and investigative journalism. The results must be made available to the public regularly to build societal awareness and resilience, as well as shared with relevant institutions to enable the adoption of necessary measures.
A. What This Analysis Is About and How We Proceeded
Our goal was to identify the main channels spreading Russian disinformation and propaganda within the Slovak information environment. The analysis focuses on identifying Slovak channels that are most actively involved in disseminating Russian content and understanding how they operate. The findings aim to help the public better understand this issue and encourage the state to adopt necessary measures.
In conducting this analysis, we combined our own environmental monitoring with tools such as Gerulata Juno and Telemetrio. The data was analyzed to compile a list of super-spreaders (definition below) of content within the Russian-language space and a corresponding list of super-spreaders in the Slovak information sphere.
Using the data gathered, we created a network analysis that mapped the connections between the different channels. This analysis identified the primary super-spreaders of Russian propaganda and disinformation in Slovakia and provided an overview of the channels that share the most Russian content. The network analysis was conducted using Gephi software.
The analysis exclusively considered messages directly forwarded from the original source. Messages originating from Russian channels but reaching Slovak channels via two or more intermediaries were excluded. Similarly, messages copied or added in the form of images, videos, or other formats were not included.
Definition of a Super-Spreader
A super-spreader in the information space can be defined as a person, account, profile, or other entity that disproportionately contributes to the dissemination of information, disinformation, or other content within a communication network, exceeding average or expected levels of influence. Examples include influencers, celebrities, media outlets, or websites with large audiences. In the context of disinformation, super-spreaders are accounts that deliberately share false or manipulative messages, reaching a large audience. Characteristics of a Super-Spreader:
- High Reach: A large number of followers, supporters, and connections to other media.
- Intense Activity: Generates or shares content at a high frequency.
- Credibility or Authority: Perceived as a trustworthy source, increasing the likelihood of others sharing its content.
- Viral Effect: Content shared by a super-spreader tends to spread rapidly due to its nature (e.g., negative, shocking, or polarizing).
B. Russian Sources on Slovak Telegram
On Telegram, there are numerous channels that coordinate the spread of Russian propaganda and disinformation with the aim of influencing public opinion in various regions. The narratives promoted by these channels are almost exclusively tied to advancing Russian strategic goals, particularly by undermining support and assistance to Ukraine and reducing trust in the EU and NATO. The categorization of source types was based on analysis by Blackbird.AI. The most dominant shared sources in the Slovak information environment include:
Official Government Channels:
Channels such as the Russian Embassy in Slovakia, the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and state news agencies share official government positions, promote Russian military activities, and support anti-Western narratives.
Military Bloggers and Propagandists (Z-Channels):
Channels such as RVvoenkor and SolovievLive, run by prominent figures like Vladimir Solovyov, focus on military updates and analyses. Their content is regularly presented from a strongly pro-Kremlin perspective.
The Largest Super-Spreaders of Russian-Language Content in the Slovak Information Environment and the Number of Shared Messages Since the Beginning of 2022, Source: Gerulata Juno
Since the start of 2022, more than 45,000 messages from over 15 different Russian-language channels have been adopted and further disseminated in Slovakia. Of this total, more than 80% of the content (over 36,000 messages) comes from just seven channels.
The Russian channels whose content is most frequently shared by Slovak super-spreaders include Russian state institutions such as the Russian Embassy in Slovakia and the state news agency RIA Novosti. Also widely circulated are channels operated by Russian military blogger Rybar (Рыбарь) and Intel Slava Z, which share Russian news about conflicts and geopolitics.
According to an analysis by IRI, the Russian Federation Embassy in Slovakia is the most active embassy in Slovakia and one of the most active Russian embassies in Europe in terms of social media content production.
C. Who in Slovakia Adopts and Spreads Russian Narratives?
The key Slovak channels on Telegram that share Russian content vary in several ways, including size, the types of sources they share, their average daily reach, their founding dates, and their target audiences. Three of these channels were established within two months of the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. Some channels were already active before the war, while others were created in 2023.
While some channels attempt to operate as independent media outlets and produce most of their content independently (e.g., Spolok ARCHA, o.z., SPRÁVY Z FRONTU, tvotv.sk, and KSB Správy), others are more closely linked to existing Russian-language sources such as Pravda Víťazí and Casus Belli Live.
Network Analysis of Relationships Between Slovak and Russian Channels Disseminating Russian Content in Slovakia, Source: Gerulata Juno. Legend: Green nodes: Slovak super-spreaders. Pink nodes: Russian super-spreaders. Gray nodes: Channels not classified as super-spreaders. Connecting arrows: Direction of sharing. The node’s name appears when clicked. Node size: Determined by the number of connections to other nodes in the analysis (Russian nodes are smaller for clarity, even though they may have more actual connections).
Who Are the Slovak Super-Spreaders of Russian-Language Sources?
Content from Russian channels is extensively shared in Slovakia. The share of Russian content varies by channel, ranging from very low levels to as high as 50% of total content. The channel Pravda Víťazí (Truth Prevails) receives the highest volume of shares from the Russian Embassy in Slovakia.
The channels most actively disseminating Russian content include:
- Casus Belli Live: Connected to Free broadcaster (Slobodný vysielač), it significantly shares content from the Russian Embassy in Slovakia and also distributes content from RIA Novosti and Rybar (Рыбарь).
- KSB News (KSB Správy): Shares content from RIA Novosti. According to its description, KSB Správy provides “world news from the perspective of the Common Security Concept,” a Russian framework promoting an alternative approach to geopolitics and international relations. This concept explains theories about elite groups allegedly controlling global processes and advocates for self-organization of society and a multivector approach to politics, often aligning with Russian national interests and aspirations for global influence.
- Truth Prevails (Pravda Víťazí): Primarily shares posts from the Russian Embassy in Slovakia.
- Info Channel of the Club of Unconventionally Thinking (Infokanál Klubu Nekonvenčne Mysliacich): Openly supports Russia’s war in Ukraine and frequently shares narratives from the Russian Embassy in Slovakia and Rybar (Рыбарь).
- tvotv.sk: Part of the media outlet TV OTV, which has long been disseminating Russian propaganda. It mainly uses the Russian Embassy in Slovakia as its source.
The largest Slovak spreaders of Russian-language content in Slovakia and the number of adopted messages since the beginning of 2022, source: Gerulata Juno
Despite the presence of Russian sources among Slovak super-spreaders, the connections between the Slovak channels themselves are much more pronounced. These channels frequently share content with each other in very high numbers, in many cases reaching thousands of messages. The strongest connection is between the channels Infokanál klubu nekonvenčne mysliacich (Info Channel of the Club of Unconventionally Thinking) and Casus Belli Live, which shared more than 30,000 messages with each other. However, a more detailed analysis would be needed to fully understand these relationships and possible collaborations between the channels.
Channels with the highest percentage of Russian propaganda in their posts
An important characteristic of Slovak super-spreaders is the proportion of native content (i.e., content directly created for the given audience) versus content taken from other channels, primarily through sharing. Among the channels that spread the most posts from Russian sources are primarily Casus Belli Live and KSB Správy (KSB News).
Option to switch the graph: Percentage of adopted Russian content / Percentage of adopted content from the total number of posts by channel, source: Gerulata Juno
Quantitative analysis has shown that the highest proportion of adopted content appears on the channels Infokanál Klubu nekonvenčne mysliacich (Info Channel of the Club of Unconventionally Thinking) and Pravda Víťazí (Truth Prevails). In both channels, more than 60% of the content is adopted from other channels.
The Pravda Víťazí channel is also the channel containing the highest percentage of content directly adopted from Russian sources. On average, every fifth post added comes from a Russian channel. It is followed by the ZvodkaOnline channel, where every tenth post added comes from a Russian channel.
The Pravda Víťazí channel is particularly remarkable for its content, as 23% of its posts come from channels linked to the entity Slovensko NEWS-FRONT.INFO, which is a Telegram channel tied to the website of the same name. Slovensko NEWS-FRONT.INFO is the Slovak version of the NewsFront website, which operates in several European countries. The Slovak version is one of the most active, and in addition to spreading Russian propaganda, it also creates content specific to the local audience. It focuses mainly on topics that resonate within Slovak society, attempting to increase its credibility. Since Slovensko NEWS-FRONT.INFO creates content tailored to the Slovak audience and in the Slovak language, it was not included in this analysis as part of the Russian super-spreaders list.
In total, 45% of the Pravda Víťazí channel’s content is Russian propaganda, giving it a clear lead in the ratio of sharing and further spreading Russian content on Slovak Telegram.
On the other hand, the channels tvotv.sk, Kanál Spolok ARCHA, o.z., and SPRÁVY Z FRONTU have the lowest proportion of adopted content from Russian Telegram channels in relation to the total number of posts. These channels focus on creating their own content and often link to their own websites while trying to develop independent journalistic activities. By sharing posts from other channels, particularly foreign news sources, they aim to increase their credibility as independent news platforms.
However, a lower percentage of shared content directly from Russian propaganda channels does not mean that these channels contain less propaganda. They often share posts from other Slovak or Czech channels, whose content is at least questionable and often includes disinformation and propaganda.
D. Examples of spreading disinformation and hostile propaganda
Many Slovak super-spreaders regularly publish content with disinformational or propagandist characteristics on the Telegram platform, consciously or unconsciously supporting the Kremlin’s strategic goals. The spread of Russian disinformation and propaganda has long focused primarily on undermining support for Ukraine and weakening trust in EU and NATO partners.
Report about Ukraine’s alleged intention to detonate a “dirty bomb”
The “dirty bomb” narrative is a recycled Russian propaganda theme. Similar claims have been repeatedly rejected by international institutions and Ukrainian officials. The intent is to discredit Ukraine based on the claim that it plans to detonate a „dirty bomb.“ The goal is to create an image of Ukraine as a country that threatens global security, thereby legitimizing Russia’s military actions. It is part of the narrative to escalate the conflict to a nuclear level.
The first post on this subject was published by the Russian-language Telegram channel voenkorkhayrullin (ВОЕНКОР МАРАТ ХАЙРУЛЛИН), followed by voenkorKotenok, a well-known pro-Kremlin military correspondent.
Initial report on Ukraine’s intention to use a so-called „dirty bomb,“ source: Telegram
Who spread this disinformation in Slovakia
The Casus Belli Live channel, since its creation in 2019, has produced over 190,000 posts and has more than 40,000 followers. The channel focuses on geopolitics, war, and conflicts, positioning itself as a source for news that mainstream media does not cover. Overall, the posts from this channel have been viewed more than 260 million times. The report about the alleged use of a dirty bomb has reached more than 10,000 views in the Slovak information space since its publication. The report spread as follows:
- August 16, 2024, 19:43 – 21:37: First publication on the voenkorkhayrullin channels at 19:43, then voenkorKotenok at 21:37.
- August 16, 2024, 21:56: Spread in Slovakia through the Casus Belli Live channel.
- August 16, 2024, 22:00 – 23:59: Other pro-Russian channels took over the report, and it was shared 32 times, 23 of those shares coming from a single profile.
Report on Ukraine’s alleged intention to use a so-called dirty bomb shared by a Slovak channel, source: Telegram
Key finding
The coordinated and rapid spread through Russian-language sources followed by sharing via channels with followers in the Central European region suggests a certain level of coordination. In less than two hours, the report spread from a Russian channel to a wide network of Slovak accounts. Although the reach of this report—10,000 views—may seem negligible, it should be noted that this channel shares dozens of similar reports. Its danger lies in the constant repetition and sharing of similar content daily, which can have a significant subliminal effect on followers.
Regular dissemination of battlefield reports written by Russian propaganda
Russian-language Telegram accounts are also spreading Kremlin propaganda in the form of reports with „information“ about ongoing battles in Ukraine. Such reports often include terms like „Nazis,“ „Ukro-fascists,“ „Western mercenaries,“ and the like. They are presented in a distorted context, for example, to align the report with narratives that justify Russia’s role as the aggressor, often exaggerating or fabricating facts.
Disseminators of such reports in the Slovak information environment mainly use Russian-language sources, including Russian Telegram accounts of military propagandist correspondents like Рыбарь (Rybár), Военкор Котенок (Voenkor Kotenok), and Два майора (Dva Majora). A disseminator of Russian narratives in Slovakia is also the Telegram account tvotv.sk, which is very active on the platform (averaging more than 150 posts per day).
Regular spreading of Russian propaganda about the fighting in Ukraine by the tvotv.sk account
An example of spreading pro-Kremlin propaganda via the tvotv.sk account can be seen in a report published on May 25, 2024 (shown in the image below).
Shortened version of the original tvotv report on information from the Russian Ministry of Defense shared in the Slovak information space, source: Telegram
The Russian-language source of the report Минобороны России (Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation) publishes similar types of information daily (shown in the image below). The Russian Ministry of Defense account is a super-spreader in the Russian-language information environment, with over 614,000 followers. Over the past year, it has published nearly 13,000 posts with 1.04 billion views.
The report, which was taken over by the tvotv.sk Telegram account, can be considered propaganda because it contains subliminal messaging about the high effectiveness of the Russian military, thus implying the futility of Ukrainian defense, nationalism in Ukraine, and promoting claims that Russia is fighting against Western mercenaries and liberating villages in Ukraine. This rhetoric does not reflect the integrity of Ukraine guaranteed by treaties and supports Russia’s imperialist goals in conquering foreign territory.
Shortened version of the original report from the Russian Ministry of Defense, source: Telegram
An interesting part of the tvotv.sk report mentions that „areas of temporary deployment of the mammoth army of the AFU, foreign mercenaries, and nationalist formations, as well as military-industrial complex enterprises, were hit.“ Such information is not found in the original report from the Russian Ministry of Defense. Additionally, no mention of these claims could be found in the Russian information space. It seems that, for an unknown reason, the author of the post on tvotv.sk deliberately added their own unverified information to the report.
Who spread this disinformation in Slovakia
The Telegram account tvotv.sk had more than 6,230 followers as of December 15, 2024. Over the past year, more than 61,300 posts were published on this account, which accumulated more than 20.6 million views. It is a super-spreader in the Slovak information space, with a significant presence on YouTube as well, where it has over 38,000 followers and more than 5.3 million views over the past year. The report had over 750 views in December 2024, most likely from subscribers to the tvotv.sk channel. The report spread as follows:
- May 24, 2024, at 14:36: Original report published on the Russian Ministry of Defense account.
- May 25, 2024, at 11:02: Slovak version of the report published by the tvotv.sk account.
Key finding
Reports from the battlefield, published by Slovak super-spreaders on the Telegram platform, are mechanically taken shortly after the original report is published, almost literally, and without verification. No additional sources are provided to confirm the credibility of the published information. The reports are never critical of the Russian Federation or its military, and they are always aligned with pro-Kremlin strategic goals.
Conclusion: What can we do about it?
At a time when disinformation and propaganda pose a significant threat to societal stability, it is essential to adopt a comprehensive approach to their prevention and elimination. Effectively addressing this challenge requires coordinated efforts from various actors—from state institutions to non-governmental organizations, and the public. The following points represent key areas to focus on:
- Monitoring and analysis: Systematically monitor the spread of disinformation not only through specialized government units but also through non-governmental organizations and investigative journalism. Thorough monitoring and uncovering the background of individual disseminators allow for early detection of manipulative campaigns and the identification of their sources.
- Public awareness: Regularly make the results of analyses accessible to the public and relevant institutions. Such transparency will help raise awareness of current trends and strengthen society’s ability to resist hybrid threats.
- Public campaigns: Regularly explain the mechanisms of disinformation and propaganda spread through public campaigns with specific examples and detailed analysis. Educational programs and campaigns should promote critical thinking, source verification, and the identification of manipulative content.
- Coordination of measures: Share current findings with relevant institutions in public administration to adopt and coordinate necessary effective measures, such as in the area of strategic communication.
These steps will contribute to the creation of a basic framework for effectively protecting society from disinformation and manipulative activities that threaten democratic principles and stability.